Introduction
In the 1980s and 1990s, disability benefit rates in the Netherlands were among the highest in the world. In 2002 the number of disability benefit recipients approached the political sensitive level of one million, 800,000 of which in the employees' scheme. When the inflow rates at that time would have been continued into the future, the number of disability benefit recipients would have risen to 1.2 million or 17% of the working population by 2040 in the employees' scheme ( Van Sonsbeek, 2011) . At the time of writing, nine years later, the Netherlands is considered one of the prime examples of effective policy reform in the disability scheme (Prinz and Tompson, 2009 ). The yearly inflow into the scheme has dropped to 40 percent the level that was common until 2001 and the long term estimate of the number of disability benefits in 2040 currently amounts to 370,000 (Van Sonsbeek and Gradus, 2010) .
The Netherlands was not the only country with a disability problem (see e.g. Autor and Duggan, 2006) . Consequently, the reforms in the Netherlands follow a broader international trend from disability schemes focusing on compensation of income loss towards schemes focusing on reintegration (OECD, 2003) . Also in other countries such as Switzerland, Australia, the United Kingdom and Sweden, disability reforms took place (Prinz and Tompson, 2009, pp. 51-55) .
Switzerland undertook a series of reforms in recent years focussing on early identification and intervention in order to prevent long-term disability benefit dependency. In 2003, the Australian Disability support pension (DSP) was limited to people with a very restricted capacity to work in response to the rapid growth of the DSP program over the last three decades (Cai and Gregory, 2004 ). In addition, in 2006, the government introduced a comprehensive welfare-to-work approach. In the UK, the government has improved incentives to work through the Disabled Person's Tax Credit, which is based on the principle that work is generally good for people's health (Jones et al., 2006) . In Sweden, the fiscal crunch in the beginning of the 1990's did make a disability reform possible at earlier years. However, whereas these earlier attempts were not successful, reforms since 2002 yielded impressive results (Prinz and Tompson, 2009 ).
Between 1998 and 2006 a series of reforms have taken place in the Netherlands. Although it is clear that the combined effect of these reforms is very substantial, there has not been any conclusive research investigating the separated and combined effects of the reforms simultaneously up till now. This paper tries to fill this gap using administrative datasets of all disability benefit recipients in the Netherlands from 1999 until 2010. The immediate effects of inflow-and outflow-related policy measures on disability inflow and outflow are assessed, controlling for business cycle and seasonal effects. The effects of the different measures are quantified both in a general model and in age/gender-and sector-specific models since the measures may affect different demographic groups and sectors.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2 an overview of the Dutch disability system and a history of the most important past policy measures are given. In section 3, the development of the inflow-and outflow rates are modelled in order to disentangle the individual effects of the various policy reforms using the macro regression approach. Section 4 gives the estimation results and section 5 concludes with some policy recommendations and topics for further research.
The Dutch disability insurance schemes
In this section, an overview is given of the Dutch disability insurance schemes and the major reforms that have taken place since their introduction. As the observation period of the data used in this paper runs from 1999 to 2010, the reforms are split into two parts. Section 2.1 focuses on the policy measures taken before the end of the 1990s. Section 2.2 focuses on the more recent policy measures, starting with the introduction of premium differentiation for employers in 1998. Section 2.3 presents an overview of the literature on the effects of the recent reforms.
History and past policy measures until the end of the 1990's
The employees' disability insurance law called WAO was introduced in 1967. It integrated schemes for occupational diseases and work injuries ('risque professionnel') and other disability causes ('risque social'), combining the generosity of risque professionnel schemes with a broad risk definition as common in risque social schemes. The benefit level was not means-tested and did equal 70% of the previous wage. In addition, in 1976 the Wajong scheme for young disabled (individuals who become disabled before the age 18 and therefore had no chance to access the regular WAO scheme) was introduced.
2 Due to a recent rise in the number of young disabled this Wajong scheme recently underwent reform by pushing reintegration and still is high on the political agenda. The current government has proposed that from 2012 onwards the Wajong will only be accessible for those without any working capacity.
2 In 1976 also a scheme for self-employed was introduced. However, this scheme was privatized in 2004.
After the introduction, the number of beneficiaries in the WAO grew rapidly and soon the scheme was found to be unmanageable. In fact, as De Jong (2008) concludes, the WAO was misused twice to accommodate social change. Firstly, during the 1970s and 1980s the scheme supported the change from an industrial to a service oriented society. Massive lay-offs in the industrial sector were partly transferred to the disability scheme, which provided a generous benefit. The WAO started to function as an early retirement route (see also de Vos and Kapteyn, 1997). Secondly, according to De Jong (2008) , during the 1990s the WAO supported Dutch households in their transformation from a traditional single breadwinner type to a modern dual earner type as women had a higher chance to get a disability benefit.
Already since the early 1980s several policy measures had been introduced in an attempt to reduce the number of benefits. During the early 1980s the level of the disability benefits was decreased. Replacement rates fell from 90% to 75% but were still extremely high by international standards, in particular for non-work-related injuries. Until 1987, the partially disabled were allowed full benefits, accommodating a lot of hidden unemployment within the scheme (Koning and Van Vuuren, 2010) . In 1991 a controversial scheme of premiums and fines for employers based on their disability benefit inflow was introduced. In 1993, after political turmoil, a new law was adopted that proved to be the first really successful reform. From then on at the entry examination all possible job alternatives were taken into account. As a consequence, inflow into the disability scheme dropped substantially from 93,000 in 1993 to 64,000 in 1995. Also, all the existing disability benefit recipients were re-examined, those aged 45 and below against the new criteria. Finally a two-phase benefit system was introduced, starting with a wage-related benefit followed by a lower, age-dependent follow-up benefit. However, the new entrance criteria were considered by many to be too strict and a lot of negative publicity enforced the Minister of Social Affairs to instruct the benefit administration office to relax the entrance criteria in practice.
Moreover, the two phases benefit system never really worked in practice because employers and employees organizations agreed on additional insurances covering the gap between the initial wage-related benefit and the follow-up benefit. From 1996 on, inflow started rising again very rapidly until a new record high in 2001 of 104,000 new entries. OECD (2003) concluded that the Netherlands was among the OECD members with the highest rates of disability benefit recipiency and inflow of new recipients. In particular, the high inflow rates of women and the high overall benefit recipiency among the elderly were considered worrying given the oncoming ageing of the population.
Recent policy changes
Since 1998 the following major policy reforms in the employees' disability scheme have been implemented:
 Experience rating (1998) . Until 1998 all employers paid a fixed premium rate for the disability scheme, regardless of the number of disability cases they had 3 . Since 1998 two separate premium rates exist, one differentiated rate covering the first five years of disability and one fixed rate covering the cost of the later years. The differentiated premium is based upon the firm-specific disability costs of year (t-2). The experience rating system was introduced in five steps, increasing the average differentiated premium to its structural level in  Re-examinations of the disability stock (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) abilities, but only a minimum benefit is paid to those who do not. In addition, for the WGA it is possible to opt out for a private insurer. Furthermore, the minimum grade of disability in the WIA scheme is 35% instead of 15% in the WAO. Preceding the WIA, in 2004, the waiting period for entrance into the disability scheme was extended from 1 to 2 years in order to increase the direct financial incentive for employers. During this period of incapacity, employers have full responsibility for paying their employees, so there is a strong incentive for reintegration. In addition, a financial incentive was created for employees to return to work by limiting the sick pay during the second year of incapacity to 70% of the wage instead of the average of 90% that was common until then.
These are the major policy changes that have taken place since 1998. They have in common that they actually changed the disability insurance law and that they directly affect the disability schemes. The decrease of the disability inflow since then has been impressive (see Figure 1 ).
Current inflow levels are about 40% the level of around the turn of the century. OECD (2008) concludes that this success is a consequence of a series of very comprehensive reforms, characterised by a shift of responsibilities to employers and employees, a tightening in benefit eligibility and generosity, and a (partial) privatisation of public schemes. The thick line shows the disability stock that topped the 800,000 level in 2002. The thin line
shows the inflow level that is down from around 100,000 a year around the turn of the century to around 40,000 in 2010, although it can be seen that inflow is following an upward trend during recent years.
Earlier literature
There is a substantial body of literature on the effects of individual disability reforms. Koning 
Data and model
The data used in this analysis -micro datasets of the disability schemes since 1999 -were supplied by UWV, the benefit administration office. The datasets contain both the flows (all benefits that started or terminated during the year) and the stock of benefits by the end of the year. Although the administrative data sources are complete and accurate, the data are limited to the variables that are needed for determining and paying the benefit. These include, among others, birth date, wage, grade of disability, start date and termination date of the benefit.
The datasets for the WAO-scheme are available for 1999-2010. The datasets for the WIAscheme are available for 2006-2010. Because exact dates of the inflows and outflows are known, quarterly data can be constructed from the yearly datasets. This helps to overcome the problem of a yearly time series that is too short given the number of explanatory variables 6 . Also, the time series is corrected for administrative disturbances. This procedure is described in appendix A. immediately. The regression model will also test for increasing or decreasing effectiveness of the gatekeeper protocol and the WIA law by including cross-terms of the policy variables and the time. It can be argued, for example, that on the one hand it takes time for employers to get used to the gatekeeper protocol so that effectiveness increases over time. On the other hand, it can also be argued that after using the protocol for a while attention decreases so that effectiveness decreases over time.
Among the explanatory variables we include a business cycle indicator. We tested two When using quarterly inflow data we do have to include seasonal dummies because there is a clear seasonal pattern with the highest level in the first quarter and the lowest level in the third quarter (see figure 2 ). This may be a logical consequence of entry into the disability scheme taking place exactly one year after the first day of sick leave. As sick leave levels are higher in winter and lower in summer, this pattern also appears in the disability inflow. However, it also seems that as inflow decreases, the seasonal effect is becoming smaller. Therefore, we introduce cross-terms of the seasonal dummies and the degree of inflow reduction. The model (1) results:
( 1) where I t represents the inflow rate, P t represents a vector of inflow-related policy variables (experience rating, gatekeeper, stricter examinations and WIA reform), C t represents the business cycle variable, S t represents a vector of seasonal dummies, S t ΔI t represents the cross term of the seasonal dummies and the variable ΔI t representing the degree of inflow reduction in t as compared to the base year (1999) and P t T represents the cross term of the policy variables and the time.
The dependent variable in the outflow model is the outflow rate (excluding outflows because of mortality and pensioning). The outflow rate in (t) equals the outflow in (t) over the DI stock in (t).
The explanatory variables include the outflow-related policy variables, a business cycle variable, seasonal dummies and, because outflow through recovery is most likely to take place for those who just entered the scheme, a variable representing the average inflow rate of the previous eight quarters.
Of the inflow-related policy measures, only experience rating is included as an outflowrelated policy measure as well because employers can reduce their premium by re-integrating disability benefit recipients. Experience rating indeed was intended both to reduce inflow (by preventive measures) and to increase outflow (by re-integrative measures). An important and controversial outflow-oriented policy measure is the re-examination of the disability stock against the new tighter entrance criteria. This re-examination programme was running between October 2004 and April 2009. At the same time the re-examination programme started, the general reexamination procedure for the disability stock was changed. Instead of 'mechanical' reexaminations after the first, fifth and tenth year of the benefit, the benefit administration office was given complete freedom in determining who to re-examine and when. Although both measures were introduced at the same time and the re-examinations were finished only just before the end of the observation period, it is possible to give an indication of the separate effects. The impact of the re-examination operation was reduced in 2007, when a new government took office and the age limit was reduced from 50 to 45 years. People aged between 45 and 50 were re-examined after all, but based upon the old examination and less stricter criteria. Those who had been re-examined already could re-enter the disability benefit scheme.
As a consequence, from the second quarter of 2007 onwards, the benefit administration office focused on correcting the re-examinations of beneficiaries aged 45 and over that already had taken place so that the re-examinations more or less came to a halt for a while. Therefore, the values of the policy variable are based on the number of re-examinations per quarter, with the maximum value in the last quarter of 2005 when the most re-examinations were performed 7 .
Furthermore, a cross-term is included of the re-examination operation policy variable and the time period in order to reflect changes in strictness during the re-examination operation, as it is known from the benefit administration office (UWV, 2008) that the effects of the re-examinations decreased during the operation.
The quarterly outflow data also show a clear seasonal pattern with peaks in the first and third quarter of each year (figure 3). A possible explanation for the third quarter peaks is the availability of seasonal labour in summer, which increases the chances of rejoining the labour market for disability benefit recipients. Higher outflow rates in winter seem to have mainly administrative reasons like higher inflow in winter causing higher outflow in winter because the first re-examination used to take place one year after inflow. The model (2) results.
( 2) where O t represents the outflow rate, P t represents a vector of outflow-related policy variables (experience rating, re-examinations DI stock and the change of the re-examination system), C t
represents the business cycle variable, S t represents a vector of seasonal dummies, I t-1;t-8
represents the average inflow rate of the previous eight quarters and P t T represents the cross term of the policy variable representing the re-examinations of the DI stock and the time.
Estimation results
In this section the immediate effects on disability inflow and outflow of the individual policy measures since the late 1990s are disentangled. Regression analyses are performed for the inflow and outflow rates in both persons and fde-equivalents.
In both inflow models, first order autocorrelation is present. OLS estimates yielded Durbin-Watson statistics of 0.86 and 0.84 respectively. Autocorrelation is corrected for using the Yule-Walker method of generalized least squares (GLS, see Gallant and Goebel (1976) ). Table 1 gives the GLS model estimates for the general models of the inflow rate. 7 The policy variable equals 0 in the last quarter of 2004. Although re-examinations already took place during that quarter, benefits were only terminated a minimum of two months after the re-examination, so that almost no benefits were actually terminated during that 4 th quarter of 2004. and 50% as a result of the earlier policy reforms.
We repeat the former analysis for age-and gender-specific subgroups. We distinguish four groups: men aged below 45, men aged 45 and over, women aged below 45 and women aged 45 and over. Again, autocorrelation is corrected for using the Yule-Walker method of GLS. For convenience, the results are limited to the inflow rate in persons (see table 2). For experience rating and the gatekeeper protocol, we find a higher impact among both older and younger women. This could be a consequence of the inflow rates among women being well above those of men in the beginning of the observation period, so that the highest gains from an active re-integration approach of employers could be made among women. The impact of the stricter examinations is similar for men and women. The impact of the WIA is higher among men. This is in line with the observation that men have a higher chance of receiving a partial disability benefit as in the WIA the minimum grade of disability was raised from 15% to 35%. In all four models the effect of the gatekeeper protocol increases over time and the effect of the WIA decreases over time. All four models have insignificant values of the business cycle indicator.
Finally, the former analyses on inflow are repeated for specific sectors of economic activities. UWV distinguishes 69 different sectors. They are aggregated into ten main groups, based on the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities used by Statistics Netherlands, and for which detailed information on the insured population is available.
These sectors can be expected to have different incentives from the recent policy measures.
Intuitively, one would expect the experience rating to be less effective in the public sector, which experiences a less direct and less accountable effect of higher premiums. The gatekeeper protocol can be expected to affect sectors with larger employers the most, because they can more easily deal with the administrative requirements of this law. The sector results are presented in table 3. For convenience, the results are limited to the inflow rate in persons and the seasonal dummies (that follow the same pattern as in tables 1 and 2) are excluded from the table. The results confirm intuition. For the construction sector and the hotels and restaurants sector, the effect of experience rating is comparatively large and the effect of the gatekeeper is comparatively small. Employers in this sector seem to be very sensitive to financial incentives but lack the size or the capability to successfully implement a bureaucratic protocol like gatekeeper.
On the other hand, in the financial and business sector, which has the lowest rate of inflow of disability recipients of all sectors, the effect of experience rating is non-existent but the effect of the gatekeeper protocol is substantial. Apparently, the large employers (banks, insurers etc.) in this sector initially were not sensitive to financial incentives given their low disability costs, but were able to reduce long-term disability through the gatekeeper protocol after all. In the health care sector, which is mainly populated by female workers, the effects of experience rating and gatekeeper were both large, but the WIA effects were comparatively smaller, which corresponds to the finding that the WIA affected men more than women. Another interesting result is the lack of effectiveness of experience rating in the public sector, which may be explained by the low financial accountability of public administration and educational organisations. However, the employers in the public sector, which tend to be large and used to bureaucracy, have been able to implement the gatekeeper protocol very successfully. The gatekeeper effect in the public sector is the highest out of all sectors. Also in the flexi work sector, the effect of experience rating is small. Employers in this sector have less influence on the sickness of their employees because they serve merely as an intermediary between the employee and the actual employer.
Also for the general outflow model regression analyses are performed for both the number of persons and the fde-equivalents. As no autocorrelation is present OLS estimates are used. Table 4 gives the model estimates for the outflow models (persons and fde). The results on outflow in persons show a strong upwards influence of the re-examinations of the DI stock on the outflow rate. The effect of the re-examinations of the DI stock decreases over time, although the coefficient of the cross-term is not significant in the fde model. Interestingly, the change of the re-examination system (abolition of the periodic re-examinations) has a significant negative impact on the outflow rate. It cannot yet be deducted from the data whether this is caused by the change of the re-examination system itself (e.g. the benefit administration office not being able adequately to select the cases to be re-examined) or by side effects of the re-examination of the DI stock (e.g. lack of capacity to perform regular re-examinations or recovered beneficiaries waiting to report to the benefit administration office until their reexamination). This result confirms earlier findings (UWV, 2006) that the number of "spontaneous" recoveries after the start of the re-examinations decreased remarkably. If the result is due to the change in the system, it might be so that the temporary gains of the reexaminations of the DI stock will be overcompensated by the losses from the abolition of the periodic re-examinations. Decreasing inflow is another significant reason for the decreasing outflow from the disability schemes. Experience rating increases recovery rates significantly in the persons model but the coefficient is not significant in the fde model, probably because employers are able to reintegrate mainly the partially disabled. The business cycle indicator is not significant in the persons model and is weakly significant in the fde model. Finally, the seasonal dummies for the second and fourth quarter both have significant negative values.
Again, we repeat the former analysis for age-and gender-specific subgroups. For convenience, the results are limited here to outflow in persons. The results are shown in table 5. For the older men and women we include the variable on re-examinations of the DI stock because a small part of this group (the 45-50 years old) was re-examined. However, we exclude the cross-term of re-examinations and time period as we do not know the exact numbers of re-examinations of the elderly over time so we cannot attribute time effects to effectiveness. When considering younger men and women, the same conclusions from the overall analyses come back more pronouncedly. The re-examinations of course boost outflow in these groups, but their effect significantly decreases over time. The change in the re-examination system decreases outflow due to recovery. Among older men and women, there is no effect of the re-examinations as these were mostly exempt from it. The change in the re-examination system significantly decreases outflow because of recovery, in particular for older men and women. Again, it should be noted that it is not clear whether this effect is caused by the change itself or by side effects of the re-examinations of the DI stock. Experience rating is significant for younger men only.
However, the signs of all four coefficients are positive as expected. There is no influence of the business cycle on DI outflow.
Conclusions and topics for future research
Until 2001, disability rates in the Netherlands were among the highest in the world. Major reforms took place between 1998 and 2006 causing the number of new disability claims to decrease sharply. In this paper the effects of those measures are estimated by using administrative datasets of all disability benefit recipients from 1999-2010.
It is shown that the combined policy measures have reduced inflow in persons by 63% and inflow in fde by 61%. Experience rating has reduced inflow into the WAO scheme by 13 percentage points, the introduction of the gatekeeper protocol has reduced inflow by 25 percentage points and the tightening of the eligibility criteria has further reduced inflow by 4 percentage points. The additional effect of the WIA is large as well, resulting in a decrease of inflow by 21 percentage points. Interestingly, whereas the effect of the gatekeeper protocol seems to increase over time, the effect of the WIA is decreasing over time.
All these effective policy measures have one thing in common: they focus on preventing inflow. Indeed, prevention is the best way in the long run of keeping claimant numbers low. Only the re-examinations of the disability stock from 2004 to 2009 caused a significant increase in disability outflow. However, at the same time the re-examinations boosted outflow, the recovery rates of the population not affected by the re-examinations decreased sharply, possibly due to the change in the re-examination periodicity.
An important topic for future research is whether the policy reforms remain effective in the long run, especially when pressure on the disability schemes might increase in the future more important given the recent rise in the number of disability benefit claimants. 
